1 2 3 4 5 6	DAVID R. ZARO (BAR NO. 124334) JOSHUA A. DEL CASTILLO (BAR NO. KENYON HARBISON (BAR NO. 2604 ALLEN MATKINS LECK GAMBLE MALLORY & NATSIS LLP 515 South Figueroa Street, Ninth Floor Los Angeles, California 90071-3309 Phone: (213) 622-5555 Fax: (213) 620-8816 E-Mail: dzaro@allenmatkins.com jdelcastillo@allenmatkins.com thsu@allenmatkins.com	D. 239015) (-16)
8	Attorneys for Receiver KRISTEN A. JANULEWICZ	
9	UNITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT
10	SOUTHERN DISTRI	ICT OF CALIFORNIA
11		
12	SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,	Case No. 15-cv-226 BAS (DHB)
13	COMMISSION,	NO HEARING REQUIRED UNLESS REQUESTED BY COURT
14	Plaintiff,	RECEIVER'S OPPOSITION TO
15 16 17	v. TOTAL WEALTH MANAGEMENT, INC.; et al.,	MOTION OF DEFENDANT, JACOB COOPER, FOR LEAVE TO FILE UNDER SEAL DOCUMENTATION REGARDING THE SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR RETENTION OF COUNSEL
18 19	Defendants.	Ctrm: 4B Judge: Hon. Cynthia Bashant
2021	TO ALL INTERESTED PARTIE	ES:
22	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT	Kristen A. Janulewicz (the "Receiver"),
23	the Court-appointed permanent receiver for	or Defendant Total Wealth Management,
24	Inc. and its subsidiaries and affiliates, incl	luding, but not limited to Altus Capital
25	Management, LLC (collectively, the "Rec	eivership Entities" or "Entities"), hereby
26	opposes the Motion for Leave to File Under Seal Documentation Regarding the	
27	Source of Funds for Retention of Counsel	(the "Motion") of Defendant Jacob
28	Cooper, as follows:	

Case No. 15-cv-226 BAS (DHB)

LAW OFFICES
atkins Leck Gamble

1034404.02/LA

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

The Receiver objects to the Motion as an effort to conceal information regarding the source and nature of funding for Defendant Cooper ("Mr. Cooper") proposed new counsel, Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C. ("Durham Jones").

At a January 13, 2016 status conference in this matter before Magistrate Judge Bartick, Mr. Cooper, through Durham Jones, requested authority to submit documentation regarding the nature and source of the funds that he proposes to use to pay Durham Jones' attorneys' fees on an "ex parte" basis. From the statements made at the status conference, it was clear that Mr. Cooper's intent at the time was to prevent the Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") and the Receiver from reviewing documentation as to the source and nature of funding for his attorneys' fees. The Commission and the Receiver advised Magistrate Judge Bartick of their respective objections and concerns, and each argued that the facts of this case militated in favor of allowing all parties to review any documentation submitted.

The relief requested in Mr. Cooper's Motion suggests that his position has changed¹, given that it is characterized as an application not to submit documents on an *ex parte* or *in camera* basis, but rather to submit them under seal, apparently for the purpose of protecting the individual source and nature of the funds from "public disclosure[.]" This request differs substantially from Mr. Cooper's initial suggestion that the Commission and the Receiver should be barred from any review of the submitted documents.

While the Receiver may be amenable to a process that protects sensitive information from disclosure to the public at large, she strenuously opposes any request for relief that contemplates barring her from reviewing the submitted

-2-

While Mr. Cooper's position may have changed, the Motion appears to run afoul of the Court's Civil Local Rules and Standing Order for Civil Cases, as addressed briefly below. Likewise, the Motion was not filed in accordance with the Court's requirements for noticing and calendaring civil motions.

documents and drawing her own conclusions regarding the source and nature of the funds to be used to compensate Durham Jones in connection with Mr. Cooper's legal defense.

The Court's order appointing the Receiver (the "Appointment Order") specifically charged the Receiver with identifying, securing, and marshaling the available assets of the Receivership Entities ("Receivership Assets"), meaning the Receiver has a Court-imposed obligation to guard against the inappropriate expenditure or dissipation of Receivership Assets, including for Mr. Cooper's defense. Indeed, the Receiver submits that any request by Mr. Cooper that would impose an obligation upon this Court, rather than the Receiver, to conduct a limited forensic accounting or "tracing" of funds should be denied, on the grounds that it is an improper use of limited judicial resources to conduct an accounting or "vetting" of funds that may already be the subject of the Receiver's investigation and accounting.

The Receiver therefore respectfully submits that the Motion should be denied. In the alternative, and in the event that the Court elects to grant the Motion, the Receiver requests that the Court require Mr. Cooper and Durham Jones to make complete and unredacted copies of all submitted documents available to the Receiver.

II. ARGUMENT.

A. Mr. Cooper's Cited Authority Affirmatively Supports Transparency.

As noted above, the Motion is predicated almost entirely upon Mr. Cooper's apparent desire to protect from public disclosure the source and nature of the funds he proposes to use to fund his legal defense. (See, e.g., Motion at 2:25-26; 3:2-13.) The Motion cites Dynetix Design Solutions., Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73436 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2013), for the proposition that because the individual source of the funds Mr. Cooper proposes to use (along with his or her

Case No. 15-cv-226 BAS (DHB)

financial information) is "entirely unrelated to these proceedings[,]" they should not 1 be made public. However, in Dynetix, the court reaffirmed that "[h]istorically, courts have recognized a 'general right to inspect and copy public records and 3 documents, including judicial records and documents." Id. at *2 (quoting 4 Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). 5 Accordingly, when considering a request to seal documents, "a strong presumption 6 in favor of access is the starting point." Id. (emphasis added). 7 8 In the case of non-dispositive motions, as here, parties moving to seal 9 documents must establish good cause for their request, which requires a "particularized showing" that "specific prejudice or harm will result" if the 10 information at issue is disclosed. Id. at *2-3. "[B]road allegations of harm, 11 unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning" do not suffice. Id. 12 The Motion does not supply the required particularized showing that specific 13 prejudice or harm will result from the disclosure of documents relating to the source and nature the funds Mr. Cooper proposes to use for his defense. Instead, it includes 15 only the unsupported legal conclusion that the source of the funds and his or her 16 financial information are "entirely unrelated" to this matter. This conclusory 17 allegation or opinion, unsupported by any specific evidence, cannot satisfy 18 19 Mr. Cooper's requirement to make a particularized showing of specific prejudice or 20 harm. Moreover, the Receiver has an independent obligation to determine the 21 relationship between the source and nature of these funds and the Receivership 22 23 Entities on her own, in accordance with the terms of the Appointment Order. 24 Accordingly, the Receiver requests that, to the extent this Court were to grant the 25 Motion, it require Mr. Cooper and Durham Jones to make complete and unredacted copies of all submitted documents available to the Receiver. 26

Case No. 15-cv-226 BAS (DHB)

27

28

B. The Motion Does Not Comply With The Court's Local Rules Or Standing Order.

As a preliminary matter, Civil Local Rule 79.2 requires a party seeking leave to file documents under seal to lodge the subject documents with the Court. Nothing in the Motion indicates that Mr. Cooper has done so.

More importantly, and consistent with the Ninth Circuit's requirement that a party seeking to file documents under seal provide a compelling justification (see, e.g., Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1172), this Court's Standing Order for Civil Cases (the "Standing Order") specifically reaffirms the presumptive right of public access to court records (citing Nixon v. Warner Comm., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1989)) and requires that parties provide the Court with both a specific description of the particular documents or categories of documents that require protection, and declarations establishing good cause to protect those documents from disclosure. See Standing Order at ¶ 5 ("Parties seeking a sealing order must provide the Court with: (1) a specific description of particular documents or categories of documents they need to protect; and (2) declarations showing good cause to protect those documents from disclosure.") (emphasis added).

In addition, the Standing Order further identifies the sorts of information that courts regularly agree to seal, including communications subject to the attorney-client privilege, medical and psychiatric records, federal and grand jury secrecy provisions, and confidential settlement agreements. Notably, financial information is not identified as a category of information routinely meriting protection in the Standing Order.

As noted above, Mr. Cooper justifies his request to seal documents identifying the source and nature of the funds he proposes to expend on his legal defense on the grounds that they are unrelated to this action and the receivership. Yet he provides no support for this contention, in contravention of established Ninth Circuit precedent and this Court's Standing Order, and essentially requests that the

Case No. 15-cv-226 BAS (DHB)

Court accept his representation at face value. This request is dubious, especially when paired with his initial, January 13, 2016 proposal to exclude the Commission and the Receiver from any review of these documents. The Receiver therefore requests that, to the extent this Court grants the Motion, it specifically require Mr. Cooper and Durham Jones to make complete and unredacted copies of all submitted materials available for the Receiver's review.

C. The Receiver Must Satisfy Her Obligations Under The Appointment Order.

Article XI of the Appointment Order directs the Receiver to "conduct such investigation and discovery as may be necessary to locate and account for all of the assets of or managed by Defendant Total Wealth Management, Inc., and its subsidiaries and affiliates" and to "to take such action as is necessary and appropriate to preserve and take control of and to prevent the dissipation, concealment, or disposition of any assets of or managed by Defendant Total Wealth Management, Inc., and its subsidiaries and affiliates[.]" As reflected in the Receiver's previously submitted reports to this Court, she has already confirmed that Mr. Cooper used funds raised from Receivership Entity investors for his legal defense and to pay a contemplated settlement with the Commission in connection with a related administrative proceeding

In order to satisfy her investigatory and asset preservation obligations under the Appointment Order, the Receiver must therefore be allowed to review any and all documents submitted by Mr. Cooper in support of his contention that the source and nature of the funds he proposes to use for his legal defense are unrelated to this matter. Moreover, the Receiver submits that any suggestion by Mr. Cooper that the Court – rather than the Receiver – should undertake a review and analysis of these materials reflects an improper use of limited judicial resources, particularly where the Court has already appointed a receiver to deal with these very sorts of examinations.

Case No. 15-cv-226 BAS (DHB)

1	III. <u>CONCLUSION.</u>
2	For the foregoing reasons, the Receiver respectfully requests that the Court
3	deny Mr. Cooper's Motion. In the alternative, and to the extent that the Court elects
4	to grant the Motion, the Receiver requests that the Court specifically require
5	Mr. Cooper and Durham Jones to make complete and unredacted copies of all
6	submitted materials available for the Receiver's review.
7	
8	Dated: January 27, 2016 ALLEN MATKINS LECK GAMBLE MALLORY & NATSIS LLP
9	DAVID R. ZARO JOSHUA A. DEL CASTILLO
10	KENYON HARBISON
11	By: /s/ Joshua A. del Castillo
12	JOSHUA A. DEL CASTILLO Attorneys for Receiver
13	Attorneys for Receiver KRISTEN A. JANULEWICZ
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	

Case No. 15-cv-226 BAS (DHB)

LAW OFFICES
atkins Leck Gamble

PROOF OF SERVICE 1 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Total Wealth Management, Inc., et al. 2 USDC, Southern District of California - Case No. 15-cv-226 BAS (DHB) 3 I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over 4 the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 515 S. Figueroa Street, 9th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90071-3398. 5 6 A true and correct copy of the foregoing document(s) described below will be served in the manner indicated below: 7 RECEIVER'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION OF DEFENDANT, 8 JACOB COOPER, FOR LEAVE TO FILE UNDER SEAL 9 DOCUMENTATION REGARDING THE SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR RETENTION OF COUNSEL 10 TO BE SERVED BY THE COURT VIA NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC 11 1. FILING ("NEF") – the above-described document will be served by the Court 12 via NEF. On January 27, 2016, I reviewed the CM/ECF Mailing Info For A Case for this case and determined that the following person(s) are on the 13 Electronic Mail Notice List to receive NEF transmission at the email 14 address(es) indicated below: 15 • Vincent J. Brown vince@vjblaw.com,vjblaw@gmail.com 16 John Bulgozdy 17 bulgozdyj@sec.gov,larofiling@sec.gov,berryj@sec.gov, irwinma@sec.gov 18 **Christina Lenore Geraci** 19 christina@geracilawfirm.com,maria.castro@geracilawfirm.com,jenny.par 20 k@geracilawfirm.com • Geraci Law Firm 21 christina@geracilawfirm.com 22 • Gary Y. Leung, Jr leungg@sec.gov,larofiling@sec.gov,himesm@sec.gov,berryj@sec.gov 23 Jessica Georgia Peterson 24 jpeterson@djplaw.com,khughes@djplaw.com 25 David J. Van Havermaat vanhavermaatd@sec.gov,larofiling@sec.gov,irwinma@sec.gov 26 Joshua Andrew del Castillo 27 jdelcastillo@allenmatkins.com 28

1	2. SERVED BY U.S. MAIL OR OVERNIGHT MAIL (indicate method for
2	each person or entity served): On <u>January 27, 2016</u> , I served the following person(s) and/or entity(ies) in this case by placing a true and correct copy
3	thereof in a sealed envelope(s) addressed as indicated below. I am readily familiar with this firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence
4	for mailing. Under that practice it is deposited with the U.S. postal service on
5	that same day in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion for party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or
6	postage meter date is more than 1 (one) day after date of deposit for mailing in
7	affidavit.
. 8	Mikel R. Bistrow, Esq. Via U.S. First Class Mail Ballard Spahr LLP
9	655 W. Broadway, Suite 1600
10	San Diego, CA 92101 Richard M. Kipperman Via U.S. First Class Mail
11	PO Box 3010
12 13	La Mesa, CA 91944-3010
13	I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the Bar of this Court
	at whose direction the service was made. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed
- 15	laws of the office states of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed
15 16	on <u>January 27, 2016</u> at Los Angeles, California.
16	
16 17	on <u>January 27, 2016</u> at Los Angeles, California.
16 17 18	on <u>January 27, 2016</u> at Los Angeles, California.
16 17 18 19	on <u>January 27, 2016</u> at Los Angeles, California.
16 17 18 19 20	on <u>January 27, 2016</u> at Los Angeles, California.
16 17 18 19 20 21	on <u>January 27, 2016</u> at Los Angeles, California.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	on <u>January 27, 2016</u> at Los Angeles, California.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	on <u>January 27, 2016</u> at Los Angeles, California.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	on <u>January 27, 2016</u> at Los Angeles, California.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	on <u>January 27, 2016</u> at Los Angeles, California.